In addition, the existence of a state of war brings into play certain indefinite but nevertheless extensive powers enjoyed by the President in his position as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy or implied from other duties imposed on the Chief Executive by the Constitution. Many of the extraordinary powers exercised by the President in time of war are conferred upon him by statute, Congress laying down broad objectives and basic requirements but delegating to the Chief Executive wide authority to devise the detailed means of applying the legislation. Passed in 1977, the law allows the president to declare a national emergency to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threatto national security, foreign policy, or the economythat. Senator Connally (D., Tex.), remarking that he had heard many Senators talking about “full wartime power,” pointed out that the Supreme Court had held repeatedly “that the Constitution means the same in time of war as it means in time of peace, and that a condition of war does not change any constitutional provision in any way.” On June 17, the day France sued for peace, Senator Pepper (D., Fla.) urged Congress to confer on the President “full wartime power to prepare and defend America.” A repetition of that proposal, August 14, evoked a lengthy Senate debate on the President's war powers. Congress and the President's Powers in Wartime In both the destroyer deal and the Canadian move, the President's action verged on exercise of the so-called war powers. The President's parallel move to strengthen the American defense position through creation of a joint Canadian-American Defense Board may likewise be considered an exercise of the Chief Executive's powers as Commander-in-Chief as well as of his power to conduct the foreign relations of the United States.
Attorney general Jackson's opinion supporting President Roosevelt's transfer of 50 over-age American destroyers to Great Britain, in return for the right to construct naval and air bases in British colonies in the Western Hemisphere, rested its case in part on the President's constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy.